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Topological Social Choice

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  • Luc Lauwers

Abstract

The topological approach to social choice was developed by Graciela Chichilnisky in the beginning of the eighties. The main result in this area (known as the resolution of the topological social choice paradox) shows that a space of preferences admits of a continuous, anonymous, and unanimous aggregation rule for every number of individuals if and only if this space is contractible. Furthermore, connections between the Pareto principle, dictatorship, and manipulation were established. Recently, Baryshnikov used the topological approach to demonstrate that Arrow's impossibility theorem can be reformulated in terms of the non-contractibility of spheres. This paper discusses these results in a self-contained way, emphasizes the social choice interpretation of some topological concepts, and surveys the area of topological aggregation.

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Paper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën in its series Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers with number ces9912.

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Date of creation: Mar 1999
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Handle: RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces9912

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders (forcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Compuation''(Elsevier))," Public Economics 0506013, EconWPA, revised 16 Jun 2005.
  2. Pivato, Marcus, 2008. "Sustainable preferences via nondiscounted, hyperreal intergenerational welfare functions," MPRA Paper 7461, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Tanaka, Yasuhito, 2009. "On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem when individual preferences are weak orders," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3-4), pages 241-249, March.
  4. Kari Saukkonen, 2007. "Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 637-647, June.
  5. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory (forthcoming in "Applied Mathematics and Computation")," Public Economics 0510021, EconWPA, revised 26 Oct 2005.
  6. Luc Lauwers, 2009. "The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 449-476, September.
  7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2004:i:6:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Tanaka, Yasuhito, 2007. "A topological approach to Wilson's impossibility theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 184-191, February.
  9. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem (forthcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Computation''(Elsevier))," Public Economics 0506012, EconWPA, revised 16 Jun 2005.
  10. Daniel Eckert, 2004. "Proximity Preservation in an Anonymous Framework," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(6), pages 1-6.
  11. Mabrouk, Mohamed, 2006. "Allais-anonymity as an alternative to the discounted-sum criterion in the calculus of optimal growth I: Consensual optimality," MPRA Paper 10512, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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