Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps (*)
AbstractWe consider continuous aggregation maps (e.g., social welfare functions). By assuming that the voters have preferences over social outcomes, we regard the social decision procedure as a noncooperative game, with the aggregation map as a game form. The map is called strategy-proof if it is a Nash equilibrium that the voters report their most preferred outcomes. We give sufficient topological conditions on the space of outcomes so that only dictatorial maps are strategy-proof.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 14 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: 28 February 1994/Accepted: April 22, 1996
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- Luc Lauwers, 1999.
"Topological Social Choice,"
Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers
ces9912, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- repec:ner:leuven:urn:hdl:123456789/238412 is not listed on IDEAS
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