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A robust theory of resource allocation

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  • Chichilnisky, Graciela

Abstract

The theory of social choice introduced in [5,6] is robust; it is completely independent of the choice of topology on spaces of preference. This theory has been fruitful in linking diverse forms of resource allocation; it has been shown [17] that contractibility is necessary and sufficient for solving the social choice paradox; this condition is equivalent [11] to another- limited arbitrage- which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core of an economy [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. The space of monotone preferences is contractible; as shown already in [6, 17] such that spaces admit social choice rules. However, monotone preferences are of little interest in social choice theory becasue the essence of the social choice problem, such as Condorcet triples, rules out monotonicity.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8599.

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Date of creation: 23 Sep 1994
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8599

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Keywords: social choice; resource allocation; monotonicity; preferences; Condorcet triples;

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References

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  1. Chichilnisky, Graciela & Heal, Geoffrey, 1979. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox," MPRA Paper 8495, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 1981.
  2. Chichilnisky, G., 1992. "Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 1992_60, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  3. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1979. "On fixed point theorems and social choice paradoxes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 347-351.
  4. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1980. "Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences," MPRA Paper 8006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1980. "Continuous representation of preference," MPRA Paper 8042, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Beth Allen, 1996. "A remark on a social choice problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 11-16, January.
  7. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1990. "Social choice and the closed convergence topology," MPRA Paper 8353, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1985. "Von Neuman- Morgenstern utilities and cardinal preferences," MPRA Paper 8090, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1994. "Social Diversity, Arbitrage, and Gains from Trade: A Unified Perspective on Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 427-34, May.
  10. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1997. "Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 470-479, November.
  11. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1996. "Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the non-emptiness of the core," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 177-180, August.
  12. Chichilnisky, G., 1993. "Intersecting Families of Sets and the Topology of Cones in Economics," Papers 93-17, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  13. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1982. "Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 337-52, May.
  14. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1986. "Topological complexity of manifolds of preferences," MPRA Paper 8119, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Cited by:
  1. Lauwers, Luc, 2000. "Topological social choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-39, July.

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