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Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules

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Author Info
Gleb Koshevoy (Russian Academy of Sciences, Central Economics and Mathematics Institute Krasikova 32, Moscow 117418, Russia)
Abstract

We establish that the Pareto property is inconsistent with non-dictatorship for social choice rules defined on two-dimensional choice spaces. In addition, we consider applications of this result in higher dimensions.

We also establish the existence of Pareto rules with infinite populations, and show that in this case there is a strong manipulator.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 14 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 295-302
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:2:p:295-302

Note: Received: 30 December 1994/Accepted: 22 April 1996
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  1. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory (forthcoming in "Applied Mathematics and Computation")," Public Economics 0510021, EconWPA, revised 26 Oct 2005. [Downloadable!]
  2. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders (forcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Compuation''(Elsevier))," Public Economics 0506013, EconWPA, revised 16 Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
  3. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem (forthcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Computation''(Elsevier))," Public Economics 0506012, EconWPA, revised 16 Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
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