Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gleb Koshevoy

    (Russian Academy of Sciences, Central Economics and Mathematics Institute Krasikova 32, Moscow 117418, Russia)

Abstract

We establish that the Pareto property is inconsistent with non-dictatorship for social choice rules defined on two-dimensional choice spaces. In addition, we consider applications of this result in higher dimensions. We also establish the existence of Pareto rules with infinite populations, and show that in this case there is a strong manipulator.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/7014002/70140295.pdf
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/7014002/70140295.ps.gz
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 14 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 295-302

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:2:p:295-302

Note: Received: 30 December 1994/Accepted: 22 April 1996
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Tanaka, Yasuhito, 2007. "A topological approach to Wilson's impossibility theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 184-191, February.
  2. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory (forthcoming in "Applied Mathematics and Computation")," Public Economics 0510021, EconWPA, revised 26 Oct 2005.
  3. Lauwers, Luc, 2000. "Topological social choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-39, July.
  4. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders (forcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Compuation''(Elsevier))," Public Economics 0506013, EconWPA, revised 16 Jun 2005.
  5. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem (forthcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Computation''(Elsevier))," Public Economics 0506012, EconWPA, revised 16 Jun 2005.
  6. Tanaka, Yasuhito, 2009. "On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem when individual preferences are weak orders," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3-4), pages 241-249, March.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:2:p:295-302. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.