On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem (forthcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Computation''(Elsevier))
AbstractWe will show that in the case where there are two individuals and three alternatives (or under the assumption of free-triple property) the Arrow impossibility theorem for social welfare functions that there exists no social welfare function which satisfies transitivity, Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and has no dictator is equivalent to the Brouwer fixed point theorem on a 2-dimensional ball (circle).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0506012.
Date of creation: 16 Jun 2005
Date of revision: 16 Jun 2005
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H - Public Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-06-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-HPE-2005-06-27 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-06-27 (Public Economics)
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