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Topological manipulators form an ultrafilter

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Author Info
Luc Lauwers ()

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Abstract

Consider the problem of aggregating preferences. A coalition is manipulative if it is able to force the outcome of the aggregation process. In the framework of topological aggregation (due to Chichilnisky) the family of manipulative coalitions constitutes an ultrafilter. This result holds for finite and for infinite populations, and supports the analogy between the Chichilnisky and the Arrovian aggregation model. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-003-0225-y
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 22 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
Pages: 437-445
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:22:y:2004:i:3:p:437-445

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  1. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory (forthcoming in "Applied Mathematics and Computation")," Public Economics 0510021, EconWPA, revised 26 Oct 2005. [Downloadable!]
  2. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders (forcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Compuation''(Elsevier))," Public Economics 0506013, EconWPA, revised 16 Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
  3. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem (forthcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Computation''(Elsevier))," Public Economics 0506012, EconWPA, revised 16 Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-17.

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