A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders (forcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Compuation''(Elsevier))
We will present a topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem of social choice theory that there exists no binary social choice rule (which we will call a social welfare function) which satisfies the conditions of transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), Pareto principle and non-existence of dictator.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number
0506013.
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