A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory (forthcoming in "Applied Mathematics and Computation")
AbstractRecently Eliaz(2004) has presented a unified framework to study (Arrovian) social welfare functions and non-binary social choice functions based on the concept of 'preference reversal'. He showed that social choice rules which satisfy the property of preference reversal and a variant of the Pareto principle are dictatorial. This result includes the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem as its special cases. We present a concise proof of his theorem using elementary concepts of algebraic topology such as homomorphisms of homology groups of simplicial complexes induced by simplicial mappings.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0510021.
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 26 Oct 2005
Date of revision: 26 Oct 2005
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 11
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H - Public Economics
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