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Social Choice with Infinite Populations: Construction of a Rule and Impossibility Results

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Author Info

  • Chichilnisky, G.
  • Heal, G.M.

Abstract

We provide a simple construction of social choice rules for economies with infinite populations. The rules are continuous, Pareto and non-dictatorial; they are constructed as limits of individual preferences when the limit exists, and otherwise as adequate generalizations. This contrasts with the impossibility results of Arrow (1951) and Chichilnisky (1980), which are valid on economies with finitely many individuals. Our social choice rules are, however, limits of dictatorial rules. This paper was written in 1979.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Columbia - Graduate School of Business in its series Papers with number 95-19.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:colubu:95-19

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Postal: U.S.A.; COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, PAINE WEBBER , New York, NY 10027 U.S.A
Phone: (212) 854-5553
Web page: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/business/
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Keywords: POPULATION; POLITICS; VOTE; VOTING;

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Cited by:
  1. Defrancesco, Edi & Gatto, Paola & Rosato, Paolo, 2014. "A ‘component-based’ approach to discounting for natural resource damage assessment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 1-9.
  2. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 2009. "The topology of fear," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(12), pages 807-816, December.
  3. Pivato, Marcus, 2008. "Sustainable preferences via nondiscounted, hyperreal intergenerational welfare functions," MPRA Paper 7461, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Chichilnisky, Graciela & Heal, Geoffrey, 1983. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 68-87, October.
  5. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1983. "Social choice and game theory: recent results with a topological approach," MPRA Paper 8059, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Groom, Ben & Hepburn, Cameron & Koundouri, Phoebe & Pearce, David, 2007. "Implications of declining discount rates: Climate Change Policy in the UK," MPRA Paper 38428, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Birol, Ekin & Koundouri, Phoebe & Kountouris, Yiannis, 2010. "Assessing the economic viability of alternative water resources in water-scarce regions: Combining economic valuation, cost-benefit analysis and discounting," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 839-847, February.
  8. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 2010. "The foundations of statistics with black swans," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 184-192, March.

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