Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox

Contents:

Author Info

  • Chichilnisky, Graciela
  • Heal, Geoffrey

Abstract

We present a restriction on the domain of individual preferences that is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a social choice rule that is continuous, anonymous, and respects unanimity. The restriction is that the space of preferences be contractible. Contractibility admits a straightforward intuitive explanation, and is a generalisation of conditions such as single peakedness, value restrictedness and limited agreement, which were earlier shown to be sufficient for majority voting to be an acceptable rule. The only restriction on the number of individuals, is that it be finite and at least 2.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8495/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8495.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 25 Nov 1979
Date of revision: 20 Oct 1981
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory No. 1.31(1983): pp. 68-87
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8495

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: social choice; preferences; mathematical modeling;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, 1997. "Social choice with infinite populations: construction of a rule and impossibility results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 303-318.
  2. Brown, Donald J, 1975. "Aggregation of Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 89(3), pages 456-69, August.
  3. DEBREU, Gérard, . "Smooth preferences," CORE Discussion Papers RP -132, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Chichilnisky, Graciela & Heal, Geoffrey, 1983. "Community preferences and social choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 33-61, September.
  5. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1982. "Structural instability of decisive majority rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1-2), pages 207-221, January.
  6. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1982. "The topological equivalence of the pareto condition and the existence of a dictator," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 223-233, March.
  7. KIRMAN, Alan P. & SONDERMANN, Dieter, . "Arrow's theorem, many agents, and indivisible dictators," CORE Discussion Papers RP -118, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Coughlin, Peter & Lin, Kuan-Pin, 1981. "Continuity properties of majority rule with intermediate preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 289-296, May.
  9. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1982. "Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 337-52, May.
  10. Sen, Amartya & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1969. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 178-202, August.
  11. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1980. "Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences," MPRA Paper 8006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Fishburn, Peter C., 1970. "Arrow's impossibility theorem: Concise proof and infinite voters," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 103-106, March.
  13. Chipman, John S., 1974. "Homothetic preferences and aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 26-38, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Alex Coram, 2008. "Social choice and information: a note on the calculus of mappings from utility spaces," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2008-04, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  2. Luc Lauwers, 1999. "Topological Social Choice," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces9912, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  3. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2004. "Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 573-592, August.
  4. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1993. "Topoloy and economics: the contributions of S. Smale," MPRA Paper 8485, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. David Canning, 2007. "Valuing Lives Equally and Welfare Economics," PGDA Working Papers 2707, Program on the Global Demography of Aging.
  6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2005:i:4:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Kronewetter, Jason & Saari, Donald G., 2008. "From decision problems to dethroned dictators," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 745-761, July.
  8. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 1996. "Continuous-valued social choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 195-211.
  9. Graciela Chichilnisky, 1996. "A robust theory of resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, January.
  10. Beth Allen, 1996. "A remark on a social choice problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 11-16, January.
  11. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1990. "Social choice and the closed convergence topology," MPRA Paper 8353, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1983. "Social choice and game theory: recent results with a topological approach," MPRA Paper 8059, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Luc Lauwers, 2002. "A note on Chichilnisky's social choice paradox," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 261-266, May.
  14. Luc Lauwers, 2009. "The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 449-476, September.
  15. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1985. "Von Neuman- Morgenstern utilities and cardinal preferences," MPRA Paper 8090, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. David Canning, 2009. "Axiomatic Foundations of Cost Effectiveness Analysis," PGDA Working Papers 5109, Program on the Global Demography of Aging.
  17. Alex Coram, 2006. "Social choice with a continuous ordering function," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2006-09, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8495. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.