Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
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- Chipman, John S., 1974. "Homothetic preferences and aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 26-38, May.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1982. "Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 337-52, May.
- Sen, Amartya & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1969. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 178-202, August.
- Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, 1997.
"Social choice with infinite populations: construction of a rule and impossibility results,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 303-318.
- Chichilnisky, G. & Heal, G.M., 1995. "Social Choice with Infinite Populations: Construction of a Rule and Impossibility Results," Papers 95-19, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1980. "Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences," MPRA Paper 8006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Brown, Donald J, 1975. "Aggregation of Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 89(3), pages 456-69, August.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela & Heal, Geoffrey, 1983. "Community preferences and social choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 33-61, September.
- Kirman, Alan P. & Sondermann, Dieter, 1972.
"Arrow's theorem, many agents, and invisible dictators,"
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Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 267-277, October.
- KIRMAN, Alan P. & SONDERMANN, Dieter, . "Arrow's theorem, many agents, and indivisible dictators," CORE Discussion Papers RP -118, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Debreu, Gerard, 1972.
Econometric Society, vol. 40(4), pages 603-15, July.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1982. "Structural instability of decisive majority rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1-2), pages 207-221, January.
- Coughlin, Peter & Lin, Kuan-Pin, 1981. "Continuity properties of majority rule with intermediate preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 289-296, May.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1982. "The topological equivalence of the pareto condition and the existence of a dictator," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 223-233, March.
- Fishburn, Peter C., 1970. "Arrow's impossibility theorem: Concise proof and infinite voters," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 103-106, March.
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