General equilibrium and social choice with increasing returns
AbstractFor any intransitive community preference, we construct a non-convex economy where all the marginal cost pricing general equilibria are Pareto inefficient (theorem 3.2). The result is valid without requiring a fixed income distribution rule (corollary 3.3). Intransitive community preferences are a frequent occurrence (theorem 3.1): necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity of the community preference fail in a set which is open and dense in the space of individual preferences with a standard topology.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8124.
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
general equilibrium; pareto efficient; pareto inefficient; community preference; income distribution; topology; transitivity; market efficiency;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Debreu, Gerard, 1972. "Smooth Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(4), pages 603-15, July.
- Brown, Donald J & Heal, Geoffrey M, 1983. "Marginal vs. Average Cost Pricing in the Presence of a Public Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 189-93, May.
- Chipman, John S., 1974. "Homothetic preferences and aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 26-38, May.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela & Heal, Geoffrey, 1983. "Community preferences and social choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 33-61, September.
- Donald J. Brown & Geoffrey M. Heal, 1978.
"Equity, Efficiency and Increasing Returns,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
504, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Guesnerie, Roger, 1975. "Pareto Optimality in Non-Convex Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(1), pages 1-29, January.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1980. "Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences," MPRA Paper 8006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Brown, Donald J. & Heal, Geoffrey M. & Ali Khan, M. & Vohra, Rajiv, 1986.
"On a general existence theorem for marginal cost pricing equilibria,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 371-379, April.
- Donald J. Brown & Geoffrey M. Heal & M. Ali Khan & Rajiv Vohra, 1984. "On a General Existence Theorem for Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibria," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 724, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1986. "Topological complexity of manifolds of preferences," MPRA Paper 8119, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1990. "Social choice and the closed convergence topology," MPRA Paper 8353, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1993. "Topoloy and economics: the contributions of S. Smale," MPRA Paper 8485, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1990. "On the mathematical foundations of political economy," MPRA Paper 8123, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.