A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice
AbstractWe use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May's Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on the robustness of Majority Rule due to Maskin (1995). In each case, geometry provides new insights on the working and interplay of the axioms, and suggests new results including a new characterization of the entire class of Majority Rule SWFs, a strengthening of May's Theorem, and a new version of Maskin's Theorem.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Technical Working Papers with number 0268.
Date of creation: Mar 2001
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Other versions of this item:
- Estelle Cantillon & Antonio Rangel, 2002. "A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 587-611.
- Estelle Cantillon & Antonio Rangel, 2002. "A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9007, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Estelle Cantillon & Antonio Rangel, 2000. "A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1285, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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