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Condorcet Choice Functions And Maximal Elements

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  • Josep Enric Peris Ferrando

    ()
    (Universidad de Alicante)

  • Begoña Subiza Martínez

    ()
    (Universidad de Alicante)

Abstract

Choice functions on tournaments always select the maximal element (Condorcet winner), provided they exist, but this property does not hold in the more general case of weak tournaments. In this paper we analyze the relationship between the usual choice functions and the set of maximal elements in weak tournaments. We introduce choice functions selecting maximal elements, whenever they exist. Moreover, we compare these choice functions with those that already exist in the literature.

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File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2003-40.pdf
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2003
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2003-40.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2003-40

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Keywords: choice functions; tournaments; maximal elements.;

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References

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  1. Laffond G. & Laslier, J. F. & Le Breton, M., 1996. "Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 59-59, February.
  2. Dutta, Bhaskar, 1988. "Covering sets and a new condorcet choice correspondence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 63-80, February.
  3. B. Dutta & J-F. Laslier, 1998. "Comparison functions and choice correspondences," THEMA Working Papers 98-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  4. Peris, Josep E. & Subiza, Begona, 1994. "Maximal elements of not necessarily acyclic binary relations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 385-388, April.
  5. Josep E. Peris & BegoÓa Subiza, 1999. "Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 217-231.
  6. Laffond G. & Laslier J. F. & Le Breton M., 1993. "The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 182-201, January.
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Cited by:
  1. García-Bermejo, Juan Carlos, 2012. "A Note on Selecting Maximals in Finite Spaces," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2012/06, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
  2. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2009. "Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 317-333, February.

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