Consider a group of individuals who have to collectively choose an outcome from a finite set of feasible alternatives. A scoring or positional rule is an aggregation procedure where each voter awards a given number of points, Wj, to the alternative she ranks in Jth position in her preference ordering; the outcome chosen is then the alternative that receives the highest number of points. A Condorcet or majority winner is a candidate who obtains more votes than her opponents in any pairwise comparison.
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Paper provided by Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales in its series Papers with number
223.
Length: 17 pages Date of creation: 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:nodapa:223
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations