On the Likelihood of Condorcet's Profiles
AbstractConsider a group of individuals who have to collectively choose an outcome from a finite set of feasible alternatives. A scoring or positional rule is an aggregation procedure where each voter awards a given number of points, Wj, to the alternative she ranks in Jth position in her preference ordering; the outcome chosen is then the alternative that receives the highest number of points. A Condorcet or majority winner is a candidate who obtains more votes than her opponents in any pairwise comparison.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales in its series Papers with number 223.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 2000
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Postal: FACULTE UNIVERSITAIRE NOTRE-DAME DE LA PAIX, FACULTE DES SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES, RUE DE BRUXELLES NAMUR FRANCE.
Web page: http://www.fundp.ac.be/facultes/eco/
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GAME THEORY ; ECONOMIC MODELS ; DECISION MAKING;
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- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Aaron Meyers & Michael Orrison & Jennifer Townsend & Sarah Wolff & Angela Wu, 2014. "Generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 11-27, June.
- Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010.
"On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules,"
- Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2011.
"Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 151-162, August.
- Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Condorcet vs. Borda in Light of a Dual Majoritarian Approach," Working Papers 2010-07, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University.
- Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
- William v. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2009. "A note on Condorcet's other paradox," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 2000-2007.
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