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Condorcet Efficiency: A Preference for Indifference

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Author Info

  • Gehrlein, W.
  • Valognes, F.

Abstract

The condorcet winner in an lection is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidates in a series pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional probability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules (WSR's) on three candidates for large electorates when voter indifference between candidates is allowed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales in its series Papers with number 224.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:nodapa:224

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Postal: FACULTE UNIVERSITAIRE NOTRE-DAME DE LA PAIX, FACULTE DES SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES, RUE DE BRUXELLES NAMUR FRANCE.
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Web page: http://www.fundp.ac.be/facultes/eco/
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Keywords: STATISTICS ; PROBABILITY ; GAME THEORY;

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Cited by:
  1. Hervé Crès, 2000. "Aggregation of Coarse Preferences," Sciences Po publications 659/1998, Sciences Po.
  2. Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 289-316, August.
  3. Hervé Crès, 2001. "Aggregation of coarse preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 507-525.
  4. Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
  5. Mathieu Martin, 2002. "On the emptiness of the stability set of order d," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 313-326, June.
  6. Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
  7. M. Martin, 2001. "On the emptiness of the stability set of order d," THEMA Working Papers 2001-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  8. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.

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