Condorcet Efficiency: A Preference for Indifference
AbstractThe condorcet winner in an lection is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidates in a series pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional probability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules (WSR's) on three candidates for large electorates when voter indifference between candidates is allowed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales in its series Papers with number 224.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2000
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Postal: FACULTE UNIVERSITAIRE NOTRE-DAME DE LA PAIX, FACULTE DES SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES, RUE DE BRUXELLES NAMUR FRANCE.
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STATISTICS ; PROBABILITY ; GAME THEORY;
Other versions of this item:
- Fabrice Valognes & William V. Gehrlein, 2001. "Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 193-205.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Mathieu Martin, 2002. "On the emptiness of the stability set of order d," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 313-326, June.
- Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
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