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Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power

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Author Info
Daniel Diermeier
Pohan Fong
Abstract

We present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining in which policy making proceeds until the proposer has no more incentive to make a new proposal to replace the previously approved policy. We characterize stationary Markov perfect equilibria for the game and show that in all pure-strategy equilibria, a majority of voters without proposal power have an incentive to protect each others' benefits to secure their own long-term bargaining positions in the legislature. As a consequence, the value of proposal power is constrained.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1464.

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Date of creation: May 2008
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1464

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Related research
Keywords: Parliamentary democracy; proportional representation; government formation; policy dynamics; lack of commitment; inefficiency.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

Cited by:
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  1. John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2009. "A Newton Collocation Method for Solving Dynamic Bargaining Games," Wallis Working Papers WP60, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-28.

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