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Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen‐Candidate Model of Representative Democracy

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  • Amrita Dhillon
  • Ben Lockwood

Abstract

The Besley‐Coate model of representative democracy has the problem of multiple equilibria (Besley‐Coate 1997). We show that requiring the Besley‐Coate political equilibria to be iteratively undominated at the voting stage refines the set of (pure strategy) political equilibrium outcomes only for those cases where at least four candidates stand for election. This note complements the results of De Sinopoli and Turrini (1999).

Suggested Citation

  • Amrita Dhillon & Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen‐Candidate Model of Representative Democracy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 171-184, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:2:p:171-184
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00094
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    Cited by:

    1. John Duggan & Yoji Sekiya, 2009. "Voting Equilibria in Multi‐candidate Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 875-889, December.
    2. De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004. "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 41-54, January.
    3. Ružica Savčić & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Apostolic voting," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 1400-1417, November.

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