Voting Equilibria in Multi-candidate Elections
AbstractWe consider a general plurality voting game with multiple candidates, where voter preferences over candidates are exogenously given. In particular, we allow for arbitrary voter indierences, as may arise in voting subgames of citizen-candidate or locational models of elections. We prove that the voting game admits pure strategy equilibria in undominated strategies. The proof is constructive: we exhibit an algorithm, the “best winning deviation” algorithm, that produces such an equilibrium in finite time. A byproduct of the algorithm is a simple story for how voters might learn to coordinate on such an equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy in its series Wallis Working Papers with number WP52.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
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Postal: University of Rochester, Wallis Institute, Harkness 109B Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-02-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2008-02-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-02-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2008-02-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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