Comparative Learning Dynamics
AbstractWe study economic environments in which agents make choices on the basis of relative performance criteria and call the associated class of dynamic adjustment rules "comparative dynamics". We distinguish two classes of learning behavior: learning from the population experience (imitative dynamics) and learning only from one's own experience (introspective dynamics). Paradoxically, for a broad class of models, comparing stochastically stable states across dynamics, agent payoffs are lower for imitative than introspective dynamics-mimicking best practice in the population is counterproductive. Copyright 2004 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 45 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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