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Cournot or Walras? Long-Run Results in Oligopoly Games

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  • Thomas Riechmann

Abstract

Recent literature shows that learning in oligopoly games might in the long run result in the Cournot or in the Walrasian equilibrium. Which outcome is achieved seems to depend on the underlying learning dynamics. This paper analyzes the forces behind the learning mechanisms determining the long-run outcome. The apparent difference between social and individual learning is caused by different degrees of rationality of the learning agents: Learning the Cournot strategy requires the agents to acquire a large amount of information and behavioral sophistication, while the Walrasian strategy can be shown to be a particular "low-rationality result."

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 162 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 702-720

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Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200612)162:4_702:cowlri_2.0.tx_2-w

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Cited by:
  1. Thomas Riechmann, 2007. "An analysis of rent-seeking games with relative-payoff maximizers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 147-155, October.
  2. Ludo Waltman & Nees Eck & Rommert Dekker & Uzay Kaymak, 2011. "Economic modeling using evolutionary algorithms: the effect of a binary encoding of strategies," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 21(5), pages 737-756, December.
  3. Thomas Vallée & Murat Yildizoglu, 2009. "Convergence in the Finite Cournot Oligopoly with Social and Individual Learning," Working Papers halshs-00368274, HAL.
  4. Koch, Rosemarie & Stadtmann, Georg, 2010. "Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung," Discussion Papers 288, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
  5. Thomas Riechmann, 2006. "Mixed motives in a Cournot game," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(29), pages 1-8.
  6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:29:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS

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