Two Notes on Replication in Evolutionary Modelling
AbstractReplicator dynamics and replication as used in evolutionary algorithms are, due to their most basic forms, structurally the same. This short note will prove this thesis. Although this finding is clear cut and easy to show, it is of great importance for the not yet united families of game theorists on the one hand and evolutionary programmers on the other, meaning that it is perfectly legal and correct to mutually use the tools and findings of each other.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät in its series Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Leibniz Universität Hannover with number dp-239.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2001
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C45 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Neural Networks and Related Topics
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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