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An Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms

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Author Info

  • Binmore, K.
  • Samuelson, L.

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 9323.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:9323

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.

Related research

Keywords: economic theory;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Edward Castronova, 2003. "Theory of the Avatar," CESifo Working Paper Series 863, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Gotts, Nicholas M. & Polhill, J. Gary, 2007. "Transient and asymptotic dynamics of reinforcement learning in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 259-276, November.
  3. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2004. "Social Reciprocity," IZA Discussion Papers 1347, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Judith Avrahami & Werner Güth & Ralph Hertwig & Yaakov Kareev & Hironori Otsubo, 2010. "Learning (Not) To Yield: An Experimental Study of Evolving Ultimatum Game Behavior," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-092, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  5. Villena, Mauricio G. & Villena, Marcelo J., 2004. "Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?," MPRA Paper 28889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Ernst Fehr & Georg Kirchsteiger & Arno Riedl, 2003. "Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets," Labor and Demography 0305002, EconWPA.
  7. Peter Matthews & Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "Why Punish: Social Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Prosocial Norms," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0213, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  8. Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, . "Stability and Change in International Customary Law," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1021, American Law & Economics Association.
  9. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg, 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series 498, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Riechmann, Thomas, 2001. "Two Notes on Replication in Evolutionary Modelling," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-239, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  11. Werner Güth & Judit Kóvaczs, 2000. "Why do People Veto? An Experimental Analysis of the Valuation and the Consequences of Varying Degrees of Veto Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 308, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?," IEW - Working Papers 034, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  13. Luciano Andreozzi, 2005. "Hayek Reads the Literature on the Emergence of Norms," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2005-03, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
  14. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through:Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Game Theory and Information 9403005, EconWPA, revised 29 Mar 1994.
  15. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, . "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 011, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  16. Nuno Garoupa, 1997. "The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach," Economics Working Papers 245, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

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