1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. repec:att:wimass:199325 is not listed on IDEAS
3. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
4. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
5. R. Cressman, K.H. Schlag, 1995. "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 347, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • R. Cressman & K.H. Schlag, . "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," ELSE working papers 027, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
   • Cressman, R. & Schlag, K. H., 1998. "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 260-285, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Hammerstein, Peter & Selten, Reinhard, 1994. "Game theory and evolutionary biology," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 28, pages 929-993 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Noeldecke,Georg & Samuelson,Larry, . "An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 228, University of Bonn, Germany.
   Other versions:
   • Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Francesco Squintani, 2004. "Backward Induction and Model Deterioration," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1157-1157. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Francesco Squintani, 2001. "Backward Induction and Model Deterioration," RCER Working Papers 484, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
2. Ziv Gorodeisky, 2003. "Evolutionary Stability for Large Populations," Discussion Paper Series dp312, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
3. Roland Pongou & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS," Working Papers 2009-2, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Roland Pongou & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "A dynamic theory of fidelity networks with an application to the spread of HIV/AIDS," Working Papers 2009-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
   • Roberto Serrano & Roland Pongou, 2009. "A Dynamic Theory Of Fidelity Networks With An Application To The Spread Of Hiv/Aids," Working Papers wp2009_0909, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2114, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000731, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
5. Tomer Wexler, 2005. "Evolutionary Dynamics for Large Populations in Games with Multiple Backward Induction Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp402, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
6. Ziv Gorodeisky, 2005. "Stability of Mixed Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp397, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
7. Herold, Florian, 2003. "Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences," Discussion Papers in Economics 40, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
8. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2002. "The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games," Economics Series 115, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2004. "The simple geometry of perfect information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 315-338, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2003. "On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-098/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
10. Roberto Serrano & Rene Saran, 2007. "The Evolution Of Bidding Behavior In Private-Values Auctions And Double Auctions," Working Papers wp2007_0712, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "The Evolution of Bidding Behavior in Private-Values Auction and Double Auctions," Working Papers 2007-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "The evolution of bidding behavior in private-values auctions and double auctions," Working Papers 2007-10, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]