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Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction

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  • Hart, Sergiu

Abstract

The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 41 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 227-264

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:41:y:2002:i:2:p:227-264

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Hammerstein, Peter & Selten, Reinhard, 1994. "Game theory and evolutionary biology," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 28, pages 929-993 Elsevier.
  2. R. Cressman, K.H. Schlag, 1995. "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 347, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
  5. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
  6. repec:att:wimass:9325 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Noeldecke,Georg & Samuelson,Larry, . "An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 228, University of Bonn, Germany.
  8. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
  9. Ebbe Hendon & Hans Jørgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth, . "Fictitious Play in Extensive Form Games," Discussion Papers 94-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  10. Swinkels Jeroen M., 1993. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 455-484, July.
  11. Ellison, Glenn, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45, January.
  12. repec:fth:coluec:608 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
  14. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. “Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction,” S. Hart (2002)
    by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2012-09-07 08:55:47
  2. “Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction,” S. Hart (2002)
    by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2012-09-07 08:55:47
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