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Imitation and Selective Matching in Reputational Games

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  • Thierry Vignolo

Abstract

This paper investigates imitation and selective matching in reputational games with an outside option. We identify two classes of such games, which are ultimatum and trust games. By selective matching we mean that short-runplayers have the possibility of selecting the long-run player they play against. We find that selective matching (unlike random matching) favors the equilibrium associated to reputation in the ultimatum game but not in the trust game.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number ECO2007/31.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2007/31

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Keywords: Reputation; Long-run equilibria; Selective matching; Games with an outside option;

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Cited by:
  1. Matthias Greiff, 2013. "Rewards and the private provision of public goods on dynamic networks," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(5), pages 1001-1021, November.

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