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Non-Nash equilibria of Darwinian dynamics with applications to duopoly

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Author Info
Rhode, Paul
Stegeman, Mark
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 19 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
Pages: 415-453
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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:19:y:2001:i:3-4:p:415-453

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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  1. HUANG Weihong, 2009. "Relative Profitability of Dynamic Walrasian Strategies," Economic Growth centre Working Paper Series 0903, Nanyang Technolgical University, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Economic Growth centre. [Downloadable!]
  2. Chaohong Z. & Van Witteloostuijn A., 2009. "Evolutionary Game Theory and Organizational Ecology: The Case of Resource-Partitioning Theory," Working Papers 2009002, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Carlo Altavilla & Luigi Luini & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2005. "Social Learning in Market Games," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 003, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 53, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Markus Pasche, 2002. "Heterogeneous Behavioral Rules in the Oligopolistic Case," Working Paper Series B 2002-01, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultïät. [Downloadable!]
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