A Remark on Voters' Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy
AbstractVoting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance restricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate's (1997) citizen-candidate model of representative democracy. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
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- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, . "A remark on voters' rationality in a model of representative democracy," CORE Discussion Papers RP, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1562, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004.
"When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January.
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- John Duggan & Yoji Sekiya, 2008.
"Voting Equilibria in Multi-candidate Elections,"
Wallis Working Papers, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy
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- John Duggan & Yoji Sekiya, 2009. "Voting Equilibria in Multi-candidate Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 875-889, December.
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