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A Remark on Voters' Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy

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Author Info
 De Sinopoli, Francesco
Turrini, Alessandro

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Abstract

Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance restricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate's (1997) citizen-candidate model of representative democracy. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 163-70
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:2:p:163-70

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  1. John Duggan & Yoji Sekiya, 2008. "Voting Equilibria in Multi-candidate Elections," Wallis Working Papers WP52, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

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