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Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games

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Author Info
Roger B. Myerson (Northwestern University)

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Abstract

Scoring rules are compared by the equilibria that they generate for simple elections with three candidates and voters drawn from large Poisson distributions. A calculus for comparing pivot probabilities in Poisson voting games is applied. For a symmetric Condorcet cycle, nonsymmetric discriminatory equilibria exist under best-rewarding scoring rules like plurality voting. A candidate who is universally disliked may still not be out of contention under worst-punishing scoring rules like negative-plurality voting. In elections where two of three candidates have the same position, symmetric equilibria coincide with majority rule only for scoring rules that are balanced between best-rewarding and worst-punishing. When voters also care about continuous functions of vote shares, equilibria may still depend on pivot probabilities.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0686.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0686

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1992. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems," Discussion Papers 1000, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Myerson, Roger B., 2000. "Large Poisson Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 7-45, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Roger B. Myerson, 1997. "Large Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 1189, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Andrew McLennan, 2008. "Manipulation in Elections with Uncertain Preferences," Discussion Papers Series 360, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia. [Downloadable!]
  2. Cesar Martinelli, 2000. "Simple Plurality versus Plurality Runoff with Privately Informed Voters," Working Papers 0004, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Brams, S.J. & Sanver, R.M., 2003. "Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes," Working Papers 03-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester & Rosa Ferrer, 2006. "On the Justice of Voting Systems," Economics Working Papers 987, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  5. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2008. "One person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," ECARES Working Papers 2008_017, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ecares. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
  7. Dhillon, A. & Lockwood, B., 1999. "When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 549, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Voorneveld, M., 2000. "Maximum likelihood equilibria of games with population uncertainty," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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