Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games
AbstractA general class of models is developed for analyzing games with population uncertainty. Within this general class, a special class of Poisson games is defined. It is shown that Poisson games are uniquely characterized by properties of independent actions and enviornmental equivalence. The general definition of equilibrium for games with population uncertainty is formulated, and it is shown that the equilibria of Poisson games are invariant under payoff-irrelevant type splitting. An example of a large voting game is discussed, to illustrate the advantages of using a Poisson game model for large games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1102R.
Date of creation: Sep 1994
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1103, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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"Games with Incomplete Information,"
Nobel Prize in Economics documents
1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
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- Poisson games in Wikipedia (English)
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