Voluntary voting: Costs and benefits
AbstractWe compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria involve sincere voting and positive participation. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. When voting is costless, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting. Even when voting is costly, participation rates are such that, in the limit, the correct candidate is elected—that is, information fully aggregates. Because it economizes on costs, voluntary voting is again welfare superior to compulsory voting.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 147 (2012)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Costly voting; Condorcet Jury Theorem; Information aggregation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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