Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games
AbstractA general class of games with population uncertainty is formulated to describe situations where the set of players is not common knowledge. Simplifying independent-actions and environmental-equilvalence conditions imply that the numbers of players of each type are independent Poisson random variables. Equilibria of such Poisson games are defined and proven to exist. Formulas for approximating the equilibria of large Poisson games are derived, and are applied to a voting game in which participation is costly. We review how the analysis of such voting games can become more complicated and unrealistic when the set of players is assumed to be known.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1102.
Date of creation: Sep 1994
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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
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Nobel Prize in Economics documents
1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
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