Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games
Abstract
A general class of games with population uncertainty is formulated to describe situations where the set of players is not common knowledge. Simplifying independent-actions and environmental-equilvalence conditions imply that the numbers of players of each type are independent Poisson random variables. Equilibria of such Poisson games are defined and proven to exist. Formulas for approximating the equilibria of large Poisson games are derived, and are applied to a voting game in which participation is costly. We review how the analysis of such voting games can become more complicated and unrealistic when the set of players is assumed to be known.Download Info
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1102.Length:
Date of creation: Sep 1994
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1102
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Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 1102R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
References
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- Roger B. Myerson, 1994.
"Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem,"
Discussion Papers
1103, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Myerson, Roger B., 1998. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 111-131, October.
- Harsanyi, John C., 1994.
"Games with Incomplete Information,"
Nobel Prize in Economics documents
1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1997.
"Large Poisson Games,"
Discussion Papers
1189, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Myerson, Roger B., 2000. "Large Poisson Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 7-45, September.
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