Three-way Experimental Election Results: Strategic Voting, Coordinated Outcomes and Duverger's Law
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- Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010.
"Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
- Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study," IDEI Working Papers 559, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study," TSE Working Papers 09-065, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
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