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Approval voting: three examples

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Author Info

  • Francesco Sinopoli

    ()

  • Bhaskar Dutta

    ()

  • Jean-François Laslier

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-006-0053-2
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 35 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
Pages: 27-38

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2006:i:1:p:27-38

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

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Related research

Keywords: Approval voting; Sophisticated voting; Sincere voting; Perfect equilibrium; Stable set; C72; D72;

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999. "Two examples of strategic equilibria in approval voting games," CORE Discussion Papers 1999031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
  3. Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Massó, Jordi & Vorsatz, Marc, 2006. "Weighted Approval Voting," Research Memorandum 038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2012. "Scoring Rules: A Game-Theoretical Analysis," Discussion Papers 2012-40, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  3. Sebastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," Working Papers hal-00914887, HAL.
  4. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "Size Approval Voting," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, 01.
  6. Sébastien Courtin & Matias Nùnez, 2013. "Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games," THEMA Working Papers 2013-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  7. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
  8. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2011. "On the superiority of approval vs plurality: a counterexample," Working Papers 210, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2011.
  9. Ulle Endriss, 2013. "Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 335-355, March.
  10. Dellis, Arnaud, 2010. "Weak undominance in scoring rule elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 110-119, January.

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