In this note we discuss two examples of appoval voting games. The first one, with six voters and three candidates, has a unique stable set,where each voter approves only his most preferred candidate. This strategy coincides with the sophisticated one, while other strategy combinations, leading to different outcomes, are selected by the perfect equilibrium concept. Moreover, this example shows that sophisticated voting, as well as strategic stability, does not imply the election of a Condorcet winner, even if it exists. The second example, with four voters and four candidates, shows that strategic stability does not exclude non sincere strategies. Furthermore, the same results hold in complete neighborhoods of the games considered.
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number
1999031.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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