# Fall back equilibrium

## Author Info

• Kleppe, John
• Borm, Peter
• Hendrickx, Ruud

## Abstract

Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221712003074

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## Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Operational Research.

Volume (Year): 223 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 372-379

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:223:y:2012:i:2:p:372-379

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor

## Related research

Keywords: Strategic game; Equilibrium refinement; Blocked action; Fall back equilibrium; Bimatrix game;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

## References

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1. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
2. Borm, P.E.M., 1992. "On perfectness concepts for bimatrix games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-146640, Tilburg University.
3. Jansen, Mathijs, 1993. "On the Set of Proper Equilibria of a Bimatrix Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 97-106.
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## Citations

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Cited by:
1. John Kleppe & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx, 2013. "Fall back equilibrium for $$2 \times n$$ bimatrix games," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 171-186, October.

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