Fall back equilibrium
AbstractFall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Operational Research.
Volume (Year): 223 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor
Strategic game; Equilibrium refinement; Blocked action; Fall back equilibrium; Bimatrix game;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, .
"On the strategic stability of equilibria,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Borm, P.E.M., 1992. "On perfectness concepts for bimatrix games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-146640, Tilburg University.
- repec:ner:louvai:info:hdl:2078.1/54777 is not listed on IDEAS
- Vermeulen, A.J. & Jansen, M.J.M., 1996. "Are strictly perfect equilibria proper? A counterexample," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-3816, Maastricht University.
- Jansen, Mathijs, 1993. "On the Set of Proper Equilibria of a Bimatrix Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 97-106.
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