Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
AbstractA class of voting procedures based on repeated ballots and elimination of one candidate in each round is shown to always induce an outcome in the top cycle and is thus Condorcet consistent, when voters behave strategically. This is an important class as it covers multi-stage, sequential elimination extensions of all standard one-shot voting rules (with the exception of negative voting), the same one-shot rules that would fail Condorcet consistency. The necessity of repeated ballots and sequential elimination are demonstrated by further showing that Condorcet consistency would fail in all standard voting rules that violate one or both of these conditions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 144 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Multi-stage voting Sequential elimination Condorcet consistency Top cycle Scoring rules Markov equilibrium;
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