AbstractWe analyze a model of US presidential primary elections for a given party. There are two candidates, one of whom is a higher quality candidate. Voters reside in m different states and receive noisy private information about the identity of the superior candidate. States vote in some order, and this order is chosen by a social planner. We provide conditions under which the ordering of the states that maximizes the probability that the higher quality candidate is elected is for states to vote in order from smallest to largest populations and most accurate private information to least accurate private information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19340.
Date of creation: Aug 2013
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- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Market Design
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-09-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2013-09-24 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-ORE-2013-09-24 (Operations Research)
- NEP-POL-2013-09-24 (Positive Political Economics)
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