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Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections

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Author Info
Eddie Dekel
Michele Piccione

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File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?JPEv108p34PDF
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 108 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 34-55
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:108:y:2001:i:1:p:34-55

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  1. Brian Knight & Nathan Schiff, 2007. "Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries," NBER Working Papers 13637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ali, S. Nageeb & Goeree, Jacob K. & Kartik, Navin & Palfrey, Thomas R., . "Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees (formerly: Information aggregation and equilibrium selection in committees)," Working Papers 1280, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kohnz, Simone, 2006. "Ratification quotas in international agreements," Discussion Papers in Economics 900, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2006. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000205, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, 2002. "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1448-1471, December. [Downloadable!]
  6. Erik Eyster & Matt Rabin, 2003. "Cursed Equilibrium," Method and Hist of Econ Thought 0303002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Carrillo, Juan D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2006. "The compromise game: Two-sided adverse selection in the laboratory," Working Papers 1259, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  8. Matias Iaryczower, 2008. "Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002394, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Eric Helland & Yaron Raviv, 2008. "The optimal jury size when jury deliberation follows a random walk," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 255-262, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Sugato Dasgupta & Kirk Randazzo & Reginald Sheehan & Kenneth Williams, 2008. "Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 315-335, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ulrich Doraszelski, 1999. "Deliberations with Double-Sided Information," Discussion Papers 1276R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  12. Frédéric KOESSLER & Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, 2002. "Parimutuel Betting under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers of BETA 2002-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, 2004. "Neighborhood Information Exchange and Voter Participation: An Experimental Study," Working Paper Series in Economics 8, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 29 Sep 2004. [Downloadable!]
  14. Thomas R. Palfrey, 2006. "The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory," IEPR Working Papers 06.60, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR). [Downloadable!]
  15. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1478-1497, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Juan D. Carrillo & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2007. "The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000754, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Ian Ayres & Colin Rowat & Nasser Zakariya, 2004. "Optimal two stage committee voting rules," Game Theory and Information 0412006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Battaglini, Marco, 2004. "Sequential Voting with Abstention," Papers 05-19-2004, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Carrillo, Juan D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2007. "The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory," CEPR Discussion Papers 6103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Ghosal, Sayantan & Lockwood, Ben, 2003. "Information Aggregation, Costly Voting And Common Values," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 670, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Paolo Balduzzi, 2005. "Optimal use of scarce information: When partisan voters are socially useful," Working Papers 87, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
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