Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections

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Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections

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Eddie Dekel
Michele Piccione

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Abstract

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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 108 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 34-55
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:108:y:2001:i:1:p:34-55

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Paper
- Dekel, E. & Piccione, M., 1999. "Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections," Papers 3-99, Tel Aviv.

Cited by:
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Ali, S. Nageeb & Goeree, Jacob K. & Kartik, Navin & Palfrey, Thomas R., . "Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees (formerly: Information aggregation and equilibrium selection in committees)," Working Papers 1280, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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Frédéric KOESSLER & Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, 2002. "Parimutuel Betting under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers of BETA 2002-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
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- Koessler, Frédéric & Noussair, Charles & Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, 2008. "Parimutuel betting under asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 733-744, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, 2004. "Neighborhood Information Exchange and Voter Participation: An Experimental Study," Working Paper Series in Economics 8, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 29 Sep 2004. [Downloadable!]
Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2006. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000205, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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- Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2005. "Efficiency, Equity and Timing in Voting Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5291, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2006. "Efficiency, equity, and timing of voting mechanisms," Working Papers 1262, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Thomas R. Palfrey, 2006. "The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory," IEPR Working Papers 06.60, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR). [Downloadable!]
Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, 2002. "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1448-1471, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1478-1497, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Erik Eyster & Matt Rabin, 2003. "Cursed Equilibrium," Method and Hist of Econ Thought 0303002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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Juan D. Carrillo & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2007. "The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000754, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Ian Ayres & Colin Rowat & Nasser Zakariya, 2004. "Optimal two stage committee voting rules," Game Theory and Information 0412006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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Iaryczower, Matias, 2007. "Strategic voting in sequential committees," Working Papers 1275, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Carrillo, Juan D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2007. "The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory," CEPR Discussion Papers 6103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ghosal, Sayantan & Lockwood, Ben, 2003. "Information Aggregation, Costly Voting And Common Values," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 670, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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