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Weighted Approval Voting

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Author Info
Jordi Massó ()
Marc Vorsatz ()

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Abstract

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 668.06.

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Length: 30
Date of creation: 04 Sep 2006
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Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:668.06

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Related research
Keywords: Approval Voting Neutrality

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Ballester, Miguel A., 2005. "Some remarks on ranking opportunity sets and Arrow impossibility theorems: correspondence results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 116-123, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2006. "A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 621-625, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Marc Vorsatz, 2007. "Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 127-141, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Walter Bossert & John A. Weymark, . "Utility in Social Choice," Old UBC Departmental Papers 9623, UBC Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Baigent, Nick & Xu, Yongsheng, 1991. "Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 21-29, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1996. "Ranking Opportunity Sets and Arrow Impossibility Theorems: Correspondence Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 90-101, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Jean-François Laslier, 2003. "Analysing a preference and approval profile," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 229-242, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2005. "Collective choice under dichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 165-184, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alcalde-Unzu Jorge & Vorsatz Marc, 2007. "Size Approval Voting," Research Memoranda 008, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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