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Weighted Approval Voting

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  • Massó, Jordi
  • Vorsatz, Marc

    (METEOR)

Abstract

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting [7] by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 038.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2006038

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Keywords: microeconomics ;

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References

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  1. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
  2. Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December.
  3. Marc Vorsatz, 2007. "Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 127-141, January.
  4. Sertel, Murat R., 1988. "Characterizing approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 207-211, June.
  5. Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January.
  6. Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2006. "A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 621-625, December.
  7. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
  8. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1996. "Ranking Opportunity Sets and Arrow Impossibility Theorems: Correspondence Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 90-101, October.
  9. Baigent, Nick & Xu, Yongsheng, 1991. "Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 21-29, February.
  10. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2003. "Collective Choice under Dichotomous Preferences," Working Papers, Rice University, Department of Economics 2003-09, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  11. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Ballester, Miguel A., 2005. "Some remarks on ranking opportunity sets and Arrow impossibility theorems: correspondence results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 116-123, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Alcantud, José Carlos R. & de Andres Calle, Rocio & Cascon, José Manuel, 2012. "Approval consensus measures," MPRA Paper 39610, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
  3. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsat, 2011. "Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1103, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
  4. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "Size Approval Voting," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 008, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Núñez Matias & Valleta Giacomo, 2012. "The informational simplicity of scoring rules," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  6. Houy, Nicolas, 2007. "A characterization for qualified majority voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 17-24, July.

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