Voting with preferences over margins of victory
AbstractThis paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative. The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 900.
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision: Nov 2006
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Margin of victory; plurality; abstention; strategic voting; committee voting; elections;
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Humberto Llavador, 2001.
"Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention,"
Economics Working Papers
571, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2004.
- Humberto Llavador, 2006. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 55-81, August.
- Humberto Llavador, 2003. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Working Papers 34, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003.
"A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria,"
CEIS Research Paper
31, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & IANNANTUONI, Giovanna, 2000. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2000037, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- George Stigler, 1972. "Economic competition and political competition," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 91-106, September.
- Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2006.
"A psychologically-based model of voter turnout,"
Working Papers, Concordia University, Department of Economics
08008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2008.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.