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Voting with preferences over margins of victory

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Abstract

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative. The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 900.

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Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision: Nov 2006
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:900

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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Keywords: Margin of victory; plurality; abstention; strategic voting; committee voting; elections;

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  1. George Stigler, 1972. "Economic competition and political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 91-106, September.
  2. Humberto Llavador, 2001. "Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention," Economics Working Papers 571, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2004.
  3. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria," CEIS Research Paper 31, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
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Cited by:
  1. Li, Ming & Majumdar, Dipjyoti, 2006. "A psychologically-based model of voter turnout," MPRA Paper 10719, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2008.

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