Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation

Contents:

Author Info

  • SLINKO, Arkadii
  • WHITE, Shaun
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper presents a new model of voter behaviour under methods of proportional representation (PR). We abstract away from rounding, and assume that a party securing k percent of the vote wins exactly k percent of the available seats. Under this assumption PR is not manipulable by any voter aiming at maximisation of the number of seats in the parliament of her most preferred party. However in this paper we assume that voters are concerned, first and foremost, with the distribution of power in the post-election parliament. We show that, irrespective of which positional scoring rule is adopted, there will always exist circumstances where a voter would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that a voter’s attitude toward uncertainty can influence her incentives to make an insincere vote. Finally, we show that the introduction of a threshold - a rule that a party must secure at least a certain percentage of the vote in order to reach parliament - creates new opportunities for strategic voting. We use the model to explain voter behaviour at the most recent New Zealand general election.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/12-2006-cah.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 12-2006.

    as in new window
    Length: 21 pages
    Date of creation: 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:12-2006

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: C.P. 6128, Succ. centre-ville, Montréal (PQ) H3C 3J7
    Phone: (514) 343-6557
    Fax: (514) 343-7221
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: parliament choosing rule; proportional representation; power index; strategic voting; manipulability;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. De Sinopoli, F. & Iannantuoni, G., 2005. "Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0531, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey., 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," Working Papers 643, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    3. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & IANNANTUONI, Giovanna, 2000. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 2000037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2002. "Some Results On Strategic Voting And Proportional Representation With Multidimensional Policy Space," Economics Working Papers we025721, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:12-2006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sharon BREWER).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.