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Voting with preferences over margins of victory

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  • Llavador, Humberto

Abstract

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative, providing a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in [Alesina, Alberto, Rosenthal, Howard, 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge] and the benefit of voting function in [Llavador, Humberto, 2006. Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention. Social Choice and Welfare 27 (1), 55-81]. Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

Suggested Citation

  • Llavador, Humberto, 2008. "Voting with preferences over margins of victory," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 355-365, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:3:p:355-365
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
    2. Kedar, Orit, 2005. "When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancingin Parliamentary Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(2), pages 185-199, May.
    3. George Stigler, 1972. "Economic competition and political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 91-106, September.
    4. Humberto Llavador, 2006. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 55-81, August.
    5. David A. M. Peterson & Lawrence J. Grossback & James A. Stimson & Amy Gangl, 2003. "Congressional Response to Mandate Elections," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(3), pages 411-426, July.
    6. James Fowler, 2005. "Dynamic Responsiveness in the U.S. Senate," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(2), pages 299-312, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2010. "A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(5), pages 979-1002, October.
    2. Helios Herrera & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Joseph C McMurray, 2019. "The Marginal Voter's Curse," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(624), pages 3137-3153.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Margin of victory Mandates Plurality Abstention Strategic voting;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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