Voting with preferences over margins of victory
This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative. The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.
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- Humberto Llavador, 2006.
"Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 55-81, August.
- Humberto Llavador, 2001. "Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention," Economics Working Papers 571, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2004.
- Humberto Llavador, 2003. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Working Papers 34, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007.
"A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria," CEIS Research Paper 31, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & IANNANTUONI, Giovanna, 2000. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 2000037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- George Stigler, 1972. "Economic competition and political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 91-106, September.
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