On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 34 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
- Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000. "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672.
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"Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games,"
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- Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games," Discussion Papers 2007-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2012. "Scoring Rules: A Game-Theoretical Analysis," Discussion Papers 2012-40, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- De Sinopoli, Francesco & Iannantuoni, Giovanna, .
"On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly,"
Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
info:hdl:10016/280, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 477-486, 02.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2002. "On The Generic Strategic Stability Of Nash Equilibria If Voting Is Costly," Economics Working Papers we025620, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly," CEIS Research Paper 41, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Carlos Pimienta, 2009.
"Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria,"
2009-05, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Pimienta, Carlos, 2010.
"Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 364-365, May.
- Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Finiteness of Outcome Distributions for Two Person Game Forms with Three Outcomes," Discussion Papers 2007-20, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
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