Pricing costs and information problems are introduced into a framework with consumer-producers, economies of specialization, and transaction costs to predict the endogenous and concurrent evolution in division of labor and in the information of organization acquired by society. The concurrent evolution generates endogenous growth based on the tradeoff between gains from information about the efficient pattern of division of labor, which can be acquired via experiments with various patterns of division of labor, and experimentation costs, which relate to the costs in discovering prices. The concept of Walras sequential equilibrium is developed to analyze the social learning process which is featured with uncertainties of the direction of the evolution as well as a certain trend of the evolution.
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Paper provided by Center for International Development at Harvard University in its series CID Working Papers with number
7.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - General O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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