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On The Generic Strategic Stability Of Nash Equilibria If Voting Is Costly

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  • Francesco De Sinopoli

    ()

  • Giovanna Iannantuoni

    ()

Abstract

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we025620.

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Date of creation: Nov 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we025620

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  1. Marco A. Haan & Peter Kooreman, 2003. "How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 509-522, 06.
  2. Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Govindan, Srihari & McLennan, Andrew, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 455-71, March.
  4. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, . "On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1499, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Lawrence E. Blume & William R. Zame, 1993. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9309001, EconWPA.
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Cited by:
  1. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2009. "Robust rational turnout," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 317-343, November.
  2. Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales 2007-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  3. Pimienta, Carlos, 2010. "Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 364-365, May.
  4. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "On participation games with complete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 337-352, February.
  5. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "On Asymmetric Behaviors If Voting Is Costly," Economics Working Papers we053320, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  6. Francesco De Sinopoli & Carlos Pimienta, 2009. "Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales 2009-05, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.

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