On The Generic Strategic Stability Of Nash Equilibria If Voting Is Costly

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On The Generic Strategic Stability Of Nash Equilibria If Voting Is Costly

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Francesco De Sinopoli ()
Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

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Abstract

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we025620.

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Date of creation: Nov 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we025620

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Article
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 477-486, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly," CEIS Research Paper 41, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-03-03 (All new papers)
NEP-CDM-2003-03-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-MIC-2003-03-03 (Microeconomics)
NEP-POL-2003-03-03 (Positive Political Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Govindan, Srihari & McLennan, Andrew, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 455-71, March.
Other versions:
- Govindan, S & McLennan, A, 1997. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Papers 299, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 270-286, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Marco A. Haan & Peter Kooreman, 2003. "How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 509-522, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Blume, Lawrence E & Zame, William R, 1994. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 783-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Lawrence E. Blume & William R. Zame, 1993. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9309001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "On Asymmetric Behaviors If Voting Is Costly," Economics Working Papers we053320, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- De Sinopoli, F. & Iannantuoni, G., 2005. "On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0521, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games," Discussion Papers 2007-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales. [Downloadable!]
Tasos Kalandrakis, 2009. "Robust rational turnout," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 317-343, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "Robust Rational Turnout," Wallis Working Papers WP43, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "Robust Rational Turnout," Wallis Working Papers WP44, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "On participation games with complete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 337-352, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2005. "On Participation Games with Complete Information," Wallis Working Papers WP40, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Finiteness of Outcome Distributions for Two Person Game Forms with Three Outcomes," Discussion Papers 2007-20, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales. [Downloadable!]

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