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On The Generic Strategic Stability Of Nash Equilibria If Voting Is Costly Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Francesco De Sinopoli ()
Giovanna Iannantuoni ()
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We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.
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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number
we025620.
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Date of creation: Nov 2002Date of revision:
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Govindan, Srihari & McLennan, Andrew, 2001.
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005.
"On Asymmetric Behaviors If Voting Is Costly ,"
Economics Working Papers
we053320, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Carlos Pimienta, 2007.
"Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games ,"
Discussion Papers
2007-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
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Tasos Kalandrakis, 2009.
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Economic Theory ,
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Other versions: Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007.
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International Journal of Game Theory ,
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Other versions: Carlos Pimienta, 2007.
"Generic Finiteness of Outcome Distributions for Two Person Game Forms with Three Outcomes ,"
Discussion Papers
2007-20, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
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