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Abstract

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we025620.

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Date of creation: Nov 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we025620

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2003-03-03 (All new papers)
• NEP-CDM-2003-03-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
• NEP-MIC-2003-03-03 (Microeconomics)
• NEP-POL-2003-03-03 (Positive Political Economics)

References

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1. Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
2. Govindan, S & McLennan, A, 1997. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Papers 299, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
   
   • Govindan, Srihari & McLennan, Andrew, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 455-71, March.
3. Blume, Lawrence E & Zame, William R, 1994. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 783-94, July.
   
   • Lawrence E. Blume & William R. Zame, 1993. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9309001, EconWPA.
4. De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 270-286, February.
5. Marco A. Haan & Peter Kooreman, 2003. "How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 509-522, 06.

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Cited by:

1. Pimienta, Carlos, 2009. "Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 920-927, July.
   
   • Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games," Discussion Papers 2007-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
2. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2005. "On Participation Games with Complete Information," Wallis Working Papers WP40, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
   
   • Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "On participation games with complete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 337-352, February.
3. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "Robust Rational Turnout," Wallis Working Papers WP44, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
   
   • Tasos Kalandrakis, 2009. "Robust rational turnout," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 317-343, November.
   • Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "Robust Rational Turnout," Wallis Working Papers WP43, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
4. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos, 2010. "Costly network formation and regular equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 492-497, July.
   
   • Francesco De Sinopoli & Carlos Pimienta, 2009. "Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria," Discussion Papers 2009-05, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
5. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Iannantuoni, Giovanna, . "On asymmetric behaviors if voting is costly," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/348, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
   
   • Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "On Asymmetric Behaviors If Voting Is Costly," Economics Working Papers we053320, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
   • De Sinopoli, F. & Iannantuoni, G., 2005. "On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0521, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
6. Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Finiteness of Outcome Distributions for Two Person Game Forms with Three Outcomes," Discussion Papers 2007-20, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
   
   • Pimienta, Carlos, 2010. "Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 364-365, May.

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