On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly
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References listed on IDEAS
- Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000.
"Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 2000. "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1467, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:01:p:62-78_22 is not listed on IDEAS
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005.
"On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 477-486, February.
- De Sinopoli, Francesco & Iannantuoni, Giovanna, 2002. "On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly," UC3M Working papers. Economics we025620, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly," CEIS Research Paper 41, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-424, June.
- Donald A. Walker (ed.), 2000. "Equilibrium," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 1585, April.
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- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly Voting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 29-40, February.
More about this item
KeywordsStrategic Voting; Symmetric Equilibria;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-05-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2005-05-07 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2005-05-07 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-GTH-2005-05-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2005-05-07 (Positive Political Economics)
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