On asymmetric behaviors if voting is costly
Most of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly plurality voting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active voters have the same preference order over candidates, they do vote for the same candidate. However, as an example shows, this type of result cannot be hoped for mixed strategies equilibria.
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- Iannantuoni, Giovanna & De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2002.
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UC3M Working papers. Economics
we025620, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
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- Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000.
"Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, . "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1467, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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