On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly
AbstractMost of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which ‘similar’ voters make ‘similar’ voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly plurality voting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active voters have the same preference order over candidates, they do vote for the same candidate. However, as an example shows, this type of result cannot be hoped for mixed strategies equilibria.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0521.
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
Strategic Voting; Symmetric Equilibria;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-05-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2005-05-07 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2005-05-07 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-GTH-2005-05-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2005-05-07 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995.
"The Swing Voter's Curse,"
1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, .
"Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1467, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000. "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005.
"On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly,"
Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 477-486, 02.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2002. "On The Generic Strategic Stability Of Nash Equilibria If Voting Is Costly," Economics Working Papers we025620, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly," CEIS Research Paper 41, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Howard Cobb).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.